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Thomas M. Boddez * & Alan M. Rugman**
I. INTRODUCTION
By negotiating the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United
States, the Canadian government sought to ensure its exporters more se-
cure and predictable access to the huge United States market, where a
majority of Canadian foreign trade is conducted.' Canadian exporters
were especially concerned with the increased imposition of antidumping
(AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) by the United States.2
Trade laws in the United States are effected through the Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) and the International Trade Administra-
tion of the Department of Commerce (ITA). These bodies are central to
the bifurcated, quasi-judicial administrative system used in the United
States to resolve antidumping and countervailing duty complaints. The
ITC determines whether the imported product has materially injured a
domestic producer, and the ITA determines the amount of subsidy or
dumping margin which exists
* Research Associate, Ontario Centre For International Business; Law Student, Faculty of
Law, University of Toronto.
** Professor of International Business, Faculty of Management, University of Toronto; Research
Director, Ontario Centre For International Business.
1 For a complete guide to the Canadian objectives in the FTA negotiations, see CANADA, DE-
PARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAiRS, CANADA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1986).
2 These concerns were outlined, id, at 65-69, by James F. Kelleher, then Minister for Interna-
tional Trade. Kelleher discussed the manner in which access was being frustrated by the use of trade
remedy laws, the threat posed by potential unilateral trade law changes, the inadequacy of the cur-
rent dispute settlement mechanisms, and other trade law problems requiring resolution. See also
Rugman, Canada's Agenda For Bilateral Trade Negotiations, 51 Bus. Q. 37 ( Spring 1986).
3 For a detailed analysis of the system through which trade laws are administered in the U.S.,
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The potential for abuse in the administration of United States trade
laws has been well documented4, although the impact of any such abuse
has been a subject of controversy5 . Commentators generally agree, how-
ever, that United States firms and industries make strategic use of such
'administered protection', at the expense of American consumers and Ca-
nadian exporters.
see Rugman and Porteous, Canadian and U.S. Unfair Trade Law', A Comparison of Their Legal and
Administrative Structures, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. RaG. 67 (1990). For a study focusing on the
administration of Canadian trade laws, see Porteous and Rugman, Canadian Unfair Trade Laws and
Corporate Strategy, 3 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 237 (1989).
4 For an insightful analysis of the decision-making process at the ITC, see R. Cass, Economics
in the Administration of U.S. International Trade Law (1989)(Working Paper # 16, Ontario Centre
For International Business Research Programme, Faculty of Management, University of Toronto).
For a discussion and critique of the procedures used at the ITA, see Palmeter, The Capture of the
Antidumping Law, 14 YALE. J. INT'L L. 182 (1989), which builds upon the thesis presented in J.
BHAGWATI, PROTECTIoNIsM (1988).
5 The best description of this abuse can be found in 1 CANADA, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COM-
MISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR CANADA 302-303 (1985),
which states:
U.S. trade policy is created and applied through political and legal processes which decentralize
decision-making power and enhance the political influence of relatively small and narrowly
based interest groups.... The most notable examples... are the legal mechanisms that afford
producers contingent protection from import competition. These mechanisms usually involve
countervailing duties, antidumping duties, and emergency protection for U.S. producers....
U.S. legislation gives domestic producers the right to launch costly lawsuits against foreign
rivals, with little risk of loss if the claims of unfair and injurious competition are proved
groundless.
See also Cass & Schwartz, Causality, Coherence, and Transparency in the Implementation of the
International Trade Laws in FAIR EXCHANGE: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAws 24 (M.
Trebilock & R. York ed. 1990), who present the argument that the existence of this problem is not
surprising given that ITC Commissioners have a tendency to base their decisions on political rather
than legal considerations. It has been argued by Whalley, Now That the Deal is Over: Canadian
Trade Policy Options in the 1990s, 16 CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y - ANALYSE DE POLITIQUE [CAN.
PUB. POL.] 121 (1990), that the effects of such abuse are minimal in terms of the percentage of
Canadian exports affected, and that the importance of seeking solutions to such abuse is therefore an
overrated concern. However, this argument is not tenable. It relies on CVD data from Nam, Export
Promoting Subsidies, Countervailing Threats, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1
THE WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 727 (Sept. 1987), which only covers the period from 1980-1985.
Using more updated data, and including cases such as the softwood lumber dispute in which the
Canadian government imposed an export tax to avoid the imposition of CVD's, it has been shown
that Canadian industry has suffered serious detriment as a result of United States trade actions, see
A. Anderson and Rugman, A Note on Nam's Data on the Impact of Countervailing Duty Actions;
A Canadian Perspective (1989) (unpublished). For further insight on the adverse effects on Cana-
dian exporters stemming from the abuse of trade laws by U.S. industry, see Rugman & Porteous,
The Softwood Lumber Decision of 1986: Broadening the Nature of US. Administered Protection, 2
REv. INT'L Bus. L. 35 (1988); Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on U.S. Administered Protection
and the Free Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REv. 305 (1988); A. RUGMAN & A. ANDERSON, ADMIN-
ISTERED PROTECTION IN AMERICA (1987).
6 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see A. RUGMAN & A. VERBEKE,' GLOBAL COR-
PORATE STRATEGY AND TRADE POLICY (1990). This book discusses the manner in which United
States business planners act in their own rational self interest by putting pressure on the agencies
charged with the administration of trade law to erect barriers against import competition. When the
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Canadian concerns with the effects of United States administered
protection on Canadian exporters led to the inclusion of Chapter
Nineteen in the FTA, which establishes binational panel dispute settle-
ment for AD and CVD cases.7 This article examines the potential effec-
tiveness of such panels in curbing the abuses of United States trade law
and presents evidence showing that while the regime established by
Chapter Nineteen of the FTA is not the ideal, it represents a significant
improvement over past dispute settlement procedures. In other words,
the binational panels can be a useful tool in securing increased access to
U.S. markets. As a result of Chapter Nineteen, United States adminis-
trators charged with determining dumping/subsidy levels and finding
material injury may face new restrictions on their discretionary powers;
their decisions must be based on sound reasoning, be in accordance with
law, and be backed by what the panelists consider to be substantial
evidence.
As an example we will examine the first case to come before the
panel, In the Matter of Red Raspberries From Canada,8 which provides
support for the conclusions above, and sets the stage for future panel
decisions.9 This article will then briefly touch on the implications of such
changes for Canadian exporters seeking increased access to U.S markets.
In order to establish the parameters for this discussion, this article will
first briefly examine and interpret relevant legislation.
II. DISPUTE SETrLEMENT: MECHANICS AND THEORIES
A. Applicable Legislation
Chapter Nineteen of the FTA represents the logical starting point
for a review of the legislation applicable to the operation of the binational
agency succumbs to this pressure, it disregards the welfare of consumers in order to provide shelter
to the domestic industry. As a result, the firm becomes reliant on governmental protection for its
very survival. In the long run, such reliance results in the inability of the firm to compete on the
basis of cost or product differentiation.
7 This paper focuses exclusively on the dispute settlement mechanism established in Chapter
Nineteen of the FTA to deal with AD and CVD cases. For a discussion on the effectiveness to date
of Chapter Eighteen as a means of resolving disputes stemming from the implementation and opera-
tion of the FTA, see Anderson & Rugman, The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms' Cases in the Can-
ada- United States Fee Trade Agreement: An Economic Evaluation 24 GEO. WASH. J. L. & ECON. 1
(Fall, 1990).
8 In the Matter of Red Raspberries From Canada; Binational Panel Decision, USA-89-1904-01.
9 At the time of writing, only two other decisions had been made by the panel. In Replacement
Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment, USA-89-1904-02, USA-89-1904-03, and
USA-89-1904-05, the panel rejected a challenge to the ITA's use of the "best information available"
in an administrative review of a dumping order. In Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork From Canada,
USA-89-1904-1 1, released on August 24, 1990, the panel remanded the case back to the ITC, refus-
ing to uphold the ITC determination of material injury to United States pork processors.
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panels. Most of the provisions are straightforward, and will not be dis-
cussed. Instead, this article will focus primarily on those Articles in
Chapter Nineteen which describe the role and function of the panels, and
establish the standard of review by which panels are bound. These Arti-
cles provide the legal and institutional setting within which the discus-
sions of potential panel effectiveness and the resolution of the red
raspberries case have taken place.
The first key provision states that "each Party reserves the right to
apply its antidumping and countervailing duty law to goods imported
from the territory of the other Party." 10 This falls short of what Cana-
dian negotiators were seeking; namely, a new regime of rules to deal with
unfair pricing and government subsidization." However, Canadian and
United States negotiators agreed to work towards such a regime through
the Working Group established by the parties to develop and implement
such a system 2 within five to seven years. Ideally, in a true free trade
area, there should be agreement on what constitutes a countervailable
subsidy and no need for antidumping law. 3 However, the non-inclusion
of such an agreement in the FTA does not mean that the interim solution
embodied in Chapter Nineteen is a failure. As we will show, Chapter
Nineteen represents a significant improvement over the previous system.
The function of the binational panel is to "review, based upon the
administrative record, a final antidumping or countervailing duty deter-
mination... to determine whether such determination was in accord-
ance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing
10 Canada, Department of External Affairs, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement at 271,
Art. 1902(1)(19S8)[hereinafter FTA].
11 That Canada sought such a regime is clear, see supra note 1, at 3, where it is stated that
"Canada will seek to secure our market access through.. .NEW RULES AND PROCEDURES limiting
the protectionist effect of trade remedy laws.. .and clearer definition of countervailable financial
assistance programs" (emphasis added).
12 FrA, at 279, Art. 1907.
13 For a comprehensive discussion of the issues such a new regime must address, and some of the
components it would necessarily entail, see M. Hart, The Future on the Table: The Continuing
Negotiating Agenda Under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (May 1989) (paper
presented at a conference entitled Living With Free Trade, University of Ottawa); Horlick and Ste-
ger, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, in MAKING FREE TRADE WORK: THE CANADA-U.S.
AGREEMENT 84 (P. Morici ed. 1990); M. Hart, Trade Remedy Law and the Canada-United States
Trade Negotiations, in UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (1988). For an interesting discussion suggesting the complete abolition of
AD and CVD laws, and the retention of a well conceived safeguards regime, see Trebilcock, Throw-
ing Deep: Trade Remedy Laws in a First-Best World, in FAIR EXCHANGE: REFORMING TRADE
REMEDY LAWS 235 (M. Trebilock & R. York ed. 1990). For an argument that subsidy and dump-
ing determinations should use a "net" approach, taking account of "off setting" practices in the
home country, see Anderson & Rugman, Subsidies in the U.S. Steel Industry: A New Conceptual
Framework and Literature Review, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 59 (Dec. 1989).
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Party." 4 This means that the binational panel displaces the United
States Court of International Trade (CIT) and the Federal Court of Can-
ada (FCC) as the body to which appeals from administrative determina-
tions are made.
In undertaking such a review, the panel must apply the standards of
review used by the importing country.'" This means that when reviewing
an American final determination, "the [Panel] shall hold unlawful any
determination... found.., to be unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."16
The FTA defines the applicable law as the relevant statutes, legisla-
tive history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents
of the country where the determination was made.1 7 This leads to two
situations which could result in the panel remanding the case back to the
competent investigating authority for action not inconsistent with the
panel decision."8 First, remand may be appropriate when the panel finds
a misapplication of the law, as defined by the applicable sources. Second,
and perhaps of more significance, a remand may take place when the
record lacks substantial evidence supporting the final determination.
B. Deference and the Role of the Panels
Some commentators have argued that Chapter Nineteen offers Ca-
nadian exporters little, if any, relief from the current system of United
States trade law administration. 9 They posit that Canadian negotiators
failed to make any improvement in the current trade laws or their admin-
istration by the ITC and ITA. The critics' basic premise is that without
14 FTA, at 273, Art. 1904(2). Note that the administrative record includes "all documentary or
other information presented to or obtained by the competent investigating authority" prior to reach-
ing the final determination. FTA at 281, Art. 1911.
15 FTA at 273, Arts. 1904(3).
16 Tariff Act of 1930, U.S.C. § 516a(b)(1)(B)(1980 & Supp. 1990) [emphasis added, and the
word "Panel" has been substituted for the word "Court"]. Note that a different standard, as enunci-
ated in U.S.C. § 516a(b)(1)(A), applies with respect to a determination by the International Trade
Commission not to initiate a review. Only U.S.C. § 516a(b)(1)(B) is applicable to the discussion at
hand.
17 FTA at 273, Art.1904(3).
18 The FTA provides that remand is the appropriate action to be taken by the panel Id at 274,
Art. 1904(8). While the panels are not in a position to overturn a decision made by the administra-
tive agency, this provision does force the agency to act in conformity with the wishes of the panel.
19 This view, or derivatives of it, has been expressed by several commentators, including Quinn,
A Critical Perspective on Dispute Settlement in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, 188 (M. Gold & D.
Leyton-Brown ed. 1988); Cluchey, Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. Rnv. 335, 346 (1988); Herman, Dispute Resolution; Chapter 18 and
How it Will/Should! Might Work, in THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: WHAT THOSE INTERESTED
IN BUSINESS LAW NEED TO KNOW El-1 at El-8 (J. Spence ed. 1989); Slayton, Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms in COMMENTARY ON THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 18, 20 (1988).
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any change in the trade laws, or the system by which they are adminis-
tered, no change will result in the effects they have upon exporters.
Critics of the FTA believe that the binational panel is an ineffective
substitute for the CIT and the FCC. Critics presume that the panels will
follow the practice of the CIT, which traditionally accorded a high de-
gree of deference to the ITC and ITA. This can be seen in the following
assertion made by one United States scholar:
It is to be anticipated that a panel composed of at least a majority of law-
yers will accord substantial deference to the findings of the administrative
agency. There is simply no reason to anticipate that a binational panel will
be any less deferential than a court would be under the same standard of
review. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that a binational
panel will reach a different result from that which the [CIT] would reach in
reviewing a determination of the [ITC or ITA] under United States trade
laws.2°
If one accepts this approach, the logical conclusion is that Chapter
Nineteen represents an ineffective compromise which lacks the ability to
save Canadian exporters from any perceived or actual protectionist ef-
fects of United States trade law or its administration.
C. A Positive View of the Panels
The position adopted by the critics of Chapter Nineteen has three
weaknesses. First, when evaluating potential panel effectiveness it is in-
appropriate to focus on the trade laws themselves. The fact that no
change has been made to the applicable trade laws does not ensure the
inadequacy of the binational panels as a means of dispute resolution.
The trade laws themselves are not the cause for serious concern. The
real problem lies in the application of the trade laws.21 The correct ques-
tion is whether the binational panels will result in less abusive application
of the trade laws for protectionist purposes, thereby resulting in in-
creased Canadian access to the United States market.22
20 Cluchey, supra note 19, at 347. This statement typifies the negative view of the panels held by
theorists such as those listed in the preceding footnote.
21 This view was previously forwarded by Rugman & Anderson, How to Make the Free Trade
Agreement Work" Implementing the Dispute Settlement Measures and the Subsidies Code, 11 TRADE
MONITOR 1, 7 (1989), where they stated that "there is nothing wrong with how U.S. trade remedy
law has been legislated, only with its administration within the agencies." This criticism is also
made by MeDorman, The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2 Rav. INT'L
Bus. L. 303, 325-26 (1988). For further discussion on the abusive application of United States trade
laws, see Rugman & Anderson, A Fishy Business: The Abuse ofAmerican Trade Law in the Atlantic
Groundfish Case of 1985-86, 13 CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y 152 (June 1987); RUGMAN & ANDERSON,
ADMINISTERED PROTECTION IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 79 and 85; RUGMAN & VERBEKE, supra
note 6.
22 R. LIPSEY & R. YORK, EVALUATING THE FREE TRADE DEAL: A GUIDED TOUR THROUGH
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The second error of the critics lies in the assumption that deferential
panels will necessarily reach the same decision as would the CIT. This
conclusion does not necessarily follow from the fact that the panel is
bound by the same standard of review as the CIT. The standard of re-
view which binds the CIT does not lead to a uniform interpretation of
the law; on the contrary, varying interpretations by different CIT judges
are not uncommon.2 3 This variation stems from the fact that the trade
laws are so vague that their content only emerges through interpretation.
The panels will not eliminate this room for varying interpretations.
Third, what constitutes substantial evidence to support an adminis-
trative determination is at least partially a matter for expert opinion,
open to various interpretations by the five panelists. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit24 has defined the term 'substan-
tial evidence' as follows:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion. Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evi-
dence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.
2 5
This authoritative definition of what constitutes substantial evidence
under United States law lacks precision, and leaves a great deal of room
for varying interpretations. As a standard of review, it leaves a great deal
of discretion to the reviewer.26 A panel may consider what the CIT
THE CANADA-U.S. AGREEMENT 100 (1988), argues that the Agreement "did achieve the realistic
goal of increasing security of access incrementally". This argument relies on the belief that a bina-
tional panel is a clear improvement over the status quo (i.e. the CIT), and confidence in the ability of
the two countries to successfully continue negotiating toward a comprehensive agreement on what
constitutes fair trade.
23 That the judges at the CIT did not always interpret the trade laws in a homogeneous fashion
is discussed by Horlick, Oliver, & Steger, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, in THE CANADA-UNrrED
STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT 70 (J. Schott & M. Smith ed. 1988). A
clear example of this can be seen by contrasting Carlisle Tire & Rubber Company v. United States,
564 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1983) with Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp.
1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1984). In the former case, the court held that generally available subsidies are
not countervailable, while in the latter, the court held that they are countervailable (except for tax
deductions).
24 Prior to the implementation of the FTA, decisions made by the CIT could be appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. No appeal to this or any other judicial body
from the binational panels established under Chapter Nineteen is provided for by the FrA.
25 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984), quot-
ing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 3050 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619 (1966).
26 This has been recoguized by ITC commissioner Cass, supra note 4, at 31, where he states:
It is fatuous to suggest that the decision makers (panelists) are mere ciphers. Surely, no matter
what the review standard, the reviewer makes some difference .. . . American standards for
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thought sufficient to support the determination of the administrative
agency to be wholly inadequate.
This becomes clear upon the consideration of a panel's composition.
A panel is made up of trade lawyers and other experts in the field of trade
law.2 7 It is only natural that panel members may draw upon their col-
lective experience in a way which the judiciary at the CIT could not due
to inadequate resources and expertise. After all, it should be
remembered that the replacement of a court with an administrative tribu-
nal is at least partially justified by a desire to bring specialized expertise
to an area of the law which is or has become too technical for a court to
effectively address.
Based on these observations, we reject the opinion that the presence
of the same standard of review limits the panels to interpreting the law in
the same manner as the CIT judiciary. In addition, it seems clear that
the reasoning used by the ITA and ITC in making their determinations
will not be given the unchallenged approval it received in the past. In
order to test the validity of these hypotheses, we will now study the red
raspbekry case, the first Chapter Nineteen dispute to go to a binational
panel.
III. RED RASPBERRIES FROM CANADA
A. Introduction
The case of red raspberries was the first dispute to go before a bina-
tional panel established under Chapter Nineteen of the FTA. It involved
an action brought by Canadian raspberry producers disputing the deter-
mination made by the ITA in an administrative review of the dumping
margins imposed against these producers. The complainants successfully
obtained a removal of the previously imposed duties. Section III pro-
vides a detailed analysis of the raspberry case as it progressed through
the ITC and ITA. Section IV examines the resolution of the dispute
before the binational panel.
judicial review of administrative decisions are by no means so clear, continuing, or deferential as
the argument for ineffectuality supposes.
27 FTA, 285-286, annex 1901.2 establishes the composition of the binational panels. Panel mem-
bers are to be chosen from a roster of fifty candidates, twenty five selected by each country. Candi-
dates should be of good character, high standing and repute, and shall be chosen based on
objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and familiarity with international trade law. Each Party
shall appoint two candidates to the panel, with a fifth panelist chosen through consultation. One of
the five shall be chosen by the panelists themselves to act as Chairperson. The Chairperson must be
a lawyer, as must a majority of the panel members.
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B. The Origination of the Dispute
In July of 1984, growers and packers of red raspberries in the Amer-
ican Northwest filed a petition with the ITC and the ITA alleging mate-
rial injury resulting from the dumping of red raspberries by the Canadian
red raspberry industry.28 After experiencing growth in production and
shipments in 1981 and 1982, the petitioners experienced decline in 1983,
with a corresponding detrimental effect on employment, wages, and prof-
itability.29 Meanwhile, Canadian capacity had been steadily increasing,
and imports from Canada were making major inroads into the United
States market. 30 Given the economic unfeasibility of storing raspberries
for an extended period, the American producers took action to guard
against eroding market share. Faced with these competitive pressures,
United States producers turned to United States trade remedy law for
protection.
C. The Product and Industry
Of the three raspberry varieties, red, black, and purple, the red rasp-
berry represents the dominant commercial purpose raspberry. It is sold
to retailers for resale on the fresh market, or is packed, usually in a fro-
zen state, for less immediate uses. The latter are either bulk packed (in
28 or 400 pound barrels), or retail packed for retail sale as frozen
raspberries. The preserve, dairy, bakery, confectionery, and juice/wine
industries purchase the majority of bulk packed raspberries.3
The product being imported from Canada consisted almost exclu-
sively of bulk packed red raspberries.3 2 These bulk packed berries were
the sole focus of the intestigation.
The United States raspberry industry is situated primarily in the
states of Oregon and Washington while the Canadian industry is located
in British Columbia. The industry consists of two segments: growers
28 The actual petitioners were the Washington Red Raspberry Commission, the Red Raspberry
Committee of the Oregon Cranberry Commission, the Red Raspberry Committee of the Northwest
Food Processor's Association, the Red Raspberry Member Group of the American Frozen Food
Institute, Rader Farms, Ron Roberts, and Shuksan Frozen Foods, Inc., as reported in 49 Fed. Reg.
30,342 (1984).
29 Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, USITC Investigation No. 731-TA-196 at 8,9 (Final
Report 1984), Exact figures on production, shipments, employment, wages, profitability and other
relevant data can be found in the Appendix to this USITC report. Id. at A-20, A-38.
30 Id. at A-20, A-38. For example, a 47 percent increase in imports from Canada was registered
from 1981 to 1982 (from 7.5 to I1 million pounds), and harvested acreage increased by 38 percent
between 1981 and 1983 (from 37,000 to 51,000 acres, with further increases expected).
31 For an extended discussion of the product, see id. at A4-A8.
32 Id. at A7; it was estimated that 95 percent of the imported raspberries were chilled or frozen
bulk packed.
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and packers. There has been a trend towards vertical integration, with
many growers establishing their own packing facilities. Both growers
and packers of the bulk packed raspberries were involved in forwarding
the complaint.
D. The ITC Preliminary Determination
At the preliminary stage, the ITC concluded that "there is a reason-
able indication that less than fair value (LTFV) imports of manufactur-
ing grade red raspberries packed in bulk from Canada threaten to cause
material injury to a domestic industry."33 The ITC based its opinion
solely upon the evidence of declining United States productive capacity
and increasing Canadian imports. The ITC also gave weight to the state-
ments of certain United States growers/packers who alleged lost sales
due to low priced Canadian imports.
Given the reliance on such criteria without regard to the exact na-
ture of the link between the imports and the injury, it is hardly surprising
that the majority of ITC preliminary determinations favor the United
States producer.34 In fact, it is difficult to see how any preliminary deter-
minations result in negative rulings; any competitive factor causing
poorer performance seems to justify use of this protectionist regime by
the United States producer.
E. The ITA Ruling on LTFV
The ITA determines whether Canadian imports are being sold at
LTFV prices. If so, the goods are "dumped" goods, against which duties
will be imposed (provided a positive final determination of material in-
jury is made at the ITC). The methodology used by the ITA is prima
facie quite straightforward, but several problems with it directly resulted
in the dispute which eventually reached the binational panel.
L ITA Methodology
In its investigations, the ITA looks for evidence of international
price discrimination. International price discrimination takes place when
merchandise is sold in the United States for less than its "fair" value.35
33 Id. at 9.
34 According to Anderson and Rugman, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 13 J. WORLD CoMP. 43, 47 (1989), "Cur-
rently more than 70% of all preliminary United States AD and CVD cases go against the Canadian
exporters."
35 For an excellent overview of ITA methodology and the misuse of this agent by the forces of
protectionism, see Palmeter, supra note 4.
Dispute Settlement in the Canada-U.S. FTA
11:621(1991)
In order to determine whether price discrimination exists, the ITA com-
pares the foreign market value ("FMV") to the U.S. sale price. The U.S.
price is simply the sale price to U.S. purchasers, as determined in accord-
ance with § 772 of the U.S. Tariff Act.16 Calculation of FMY must con-
form with § 773 of the Tariff Act.37
The Act provides for three alternative methods of calculating FMV.
The predominant method uses the price at which similar merchandise is
sold in the country of export.3 1 However, this may not always be possi-
ble. On occasion, the quantity sold in the home market (HM) may be
small. Thus, the Tariff Act also provides for determination of FMV
through use of the export price to countries other than the United States,
or alternatively, by use of a constructed value.39
Given that the broad language of the Tariff Act is open to various
interpretations, the ITA has published the criteria upon which it bases its
determinations.' In accordance with the Tariff Act, use of HM sales is
the primary method of determining FMV. However, the ITA will substi-
tute some other measure of FMV in four situations. Two of these situa-
tions, inapplicable in the raspberry context, occur when the exporting
country has a state-controlled economy, and when HM sales are pre-
tended or fictitious.
41
The remaining two situations did play a role in the raspberries case.
First, the ITA may not use HM sales where the quantity sold in the HM
is less than 5% of third country sales. In such a case FMV will be deter-
mined by reference either to the sale price in the third country market or
by reference to the constructed value.42 Second, constructed value will
be used where HM sale prices fall below the cost of production, and there
are an inadequate number of sales made above the cost of production in
either the third country or HM for the purposes of comparison.' 3
When constructed value is to be used, the ITA estimates and takes
the sum of the costs of material, labor, overhead, general, selling, and
administrative (GS&A) expenses, and profit.' Where actual GS&A ex-
penses are less than 10 percent of total costs, the statutory minimum of
36 Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1990).
37 Id. § 1677b.
38 Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(A).
39 rd. § 1677b(a).
40 Antidumping Duty Regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 353 (1988).
41 Id. § 353.8(a), § 353.18.
42 Id. § 353.4(a) (1988).
43 Id. § 353.7.
44 19 U.S.C. § 773(e)(1)(B); 19 C.F.R. § 353.6 (1988).
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10 percent is used.45 Similarly, where actual profit is less than 8 percent
of the total cost of manufacture, the ITA applies the statutory minimum
of 8 percent." It is not difficult to see that this can lead to an inflated
FMV for Canadian exporters who do not spend 10 percent on GS&A, or
who are not earning 8 percent profit.
2. The ITA Raspberry Ruling
On May 10th, 1985, the ITA published its final determination, find-
ing that Canadian exporters were selling red raspberries at LTFV.47 The
ITA found that two of the processors, Jesse Processing Ltd. and East
Chilliwack Fruit Grower's Cooperative, made all HM sales below the
cost of production.48 Not surprisingly, these two processors had the
highest dumping margins at 22.76 percent and 3.39 percent, respectively.
As for the other two processors involved, Abbotsford Growers Coopera-
tive Association, and Mukhtiar & Sons Packers Ltd. (M&S), the ITA
found that they made sufficient HM sales above the cost of production to
use HIM sales in calculating FMV.' 9 The ITA calculated that these two
had margins of 0.19 percent (de minimis, so the processor avoided the
imposition of duties) and 1.21 percent, respectively.
Of the processors involved in this early determination, M&S is of
particular interest because it was one of three processors to be involved in
the binational panel dispute four years later. At this stage, M&S was not
particularly distressed about the 1.21 percent margin it faced. Customs
officers received the antidumping duty order on red raspberries pending
the final ITC determination that the United States industry was suffering
material injury as a result of these imports.
3. The ITC Final Determination
By a unanimous vote of five to zero, the ITC commissioners found
material injury to the U.S. industry resulting from the sale of Canadian
red raspberry imports at LTFV. The ITC based its material injury de-
termination on declining domestic production, increasing inventories,
and a worsening profit-and-loss situation. The rapid increase in imports
from Canada, United States market price depression, and specific in-
stances of lost sales led the ITC to believe that the Canadian imports
45 Id.
46Id.
47 50 Fed Reg. 19,768 (1985).
48 Id. at 19,769.
49 Id.
50 USITC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 at 1 (Final Report, 1985).
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caused the material injury.51
F. The ITA's First Administrative Review
The Tariff Act provides for an administrative review of an existing
antidumping order in each period subsequent to the order to determine
whether the goods in question are still being sold at LTFV and to make
any necessary adjustments to the prevailing dumping margins.5 2 The
ITA released final results of the first administrative review of red
raspberries, covering the period from December 1984 through May 1986,
on June 2, 1988.11 M&S was again involved, as was a new exporter to
the U.S. and eventual complainant before the panel, Clearbrook Packers,
Inc. (Clearbrook).
Duties remained in place for several of the Canadian firms. How-
ever, in the case of M&S and Clearbrook, the ITA determined that the
dumping margins were only .28 percent and .009 percent, respectively.
54
Given that these margins fell below the de minimis level of .5 percent,
neither faced antidumping duties. Of key importance is the fact that the
ITA used HM sales, rather than constructed value in calculating FMV.
G. The ITA's Second Administrative Review
Final results of the second review of red raspberries, covering the
period of June 1986 through May 1987, were released on February 13,
1989.1' Marco Estates Ltd./Landgrow (Marco), the third of the three
complainants to eventually bring the case before the binational panel,
had begun exporting to the U.S. and was thus included in the review
along with M&S, Clearbrook and others. The ITA departed from the
use of HM sales, choosing to use constructed value to determine the
FMV for the three firms. Each of these firms had HM sales, but the ITA
stated that these sales were not "of sufficient magnitude to provide a
meaningful basis for price-to-price comparisons"."
This decision to use constructed value is interesting, given that the
Tariff Act calls for the use of HM sales where possible, and exceptions to
the use of HM sales, identified in the Antidumping Duty Regulations, do
51 Id. at 3.
52 An administrative review can be requested by firms with antidumping duties imposed against
them through the Antidumping Duty Regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 353.53a(a). The ITA will then carry
out the review in accordance with § 751 of the Tariff Act.
53 53 Fed. Reg. 20,150 (1988).
54 Id. at 20,152.
55 54 Fed. Reg. 6559 (1989).
56 Id. at 6560. The actual number and volume of sales reported by the three complainants is as
follows:
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not cover the case at hand.57 The regulations do not provide for the use
of constructed value where HM sales constitute some minimal percent-
age of United States sales. Yet, the ITA, without any supporting rea-
sons, stated in their review that "where home market sales are negligible
compared to both the volume and number of sales to the United States,
constructed value should be used to determine FMV".58
As a result of this change in ITA methodology, dumping margins of
2.59 percent, 3.67 percent and 9.15 percent were found against Clear-
brook, M&S, and Marco, respectively.59 Not surprisingly, this unex-
plained change which led to protectionist barriers against the processors
where none previously existed, spurred these processors to take action.
IV. THE BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW PROCESS
As a result of dissatisfaction with the ITA decision in the second
administrative review, M&S, Clearbrook, and Marco initiated an action
on March 15, 1989 to contest the results before a binational panel under
Chapter Nineteen of the FTA. The fact that these producers could take
any action at all underscores a key advantage of the FTA. Under the old
system, review by the CIT took from two to four years, and was ex-
tremely expensive.' In contrast the FTA provides for dispute resolution
in 315 days.61 This results in more timely decisions as well as a reduction
in the expense to complainants. Given the relatively small size of the
raspberry industry, the cost to these three complainants of instituting an
action through the CIT under the prior system would have been
prohibitive.
On July 10, 1989, the three complainants, M&S, Clearbrook, and
SALES
U.S. 3rd Country Home Market
Marco
#of sales 19 0 1*
Total lbs(000) [ 1 0 []
Clearbrook
#of sales 16 0 2
Total lbs(000) 1800 0 55
Mukhtiar
# of sales 13 1 1
Total lbs(000) 1800 35 10
*Fresh raspberries
Source: Panel Decision, supra note 8, at 7.
57 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
58 54 Fed. Reg. 6560.
59 Id. at 6561.
60 For discussion of these factors, see STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE CANADA-UNITED
STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 74 (1988); Quinn, supra note 19, at 194; LIPSEY & YORK, supra
note 22, at 100.
61 FTA, Art. 1904(14).
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Marco filed their brief with the United States-Canada FTA Binational
Secretariat (U.S. section).62 On September 8, 1989, the ITA filed its own
brief.63 The complainants then fied a reply brief on September 25,
1989." After each party presented its case to the binational panel a deci-
sion was rendered on December 15, 1989.65
Two primary arguments were used in an attempt to alter the deci-
sion of the ITA in the second administrative review.16 First, the com-
plainants submitted that the ITA did not have the authority at law to
ignore HM sales under the circumstances. Second, the complainants
claimed that the ITA determination that the volume and number of HM
sales were too small was not supported by substantial evidence.67
A. Is the ITA Determination in Accordance With Law?
L The Complainants' View
The majority of the complainants' brief attempted to show that the
ITA lacked statutory or legal authority to ignore HM sales in this case.
The complainants claimed that the use of constructed value creates artifi-
cial dumping margins," and that had HM sales been used to calculate
FMV, the result would have been de minimis dumping margins, as in the
first administrative review.
The complainants pointed out that § 773 of the Tariff Act does not
provide for ignoring HM sales which are minimal compared to United
States sales. Thus, Congress did not mandate such action. In fact, Con-
gress failed to act on an attempt by the ITA to have § 773 (a)(1)(B)
62 Brief on Behalf of the Complainants, In the Matter of Red Raspberries from Canada; USA-
89-1904-01.
63 Reply Brief of the Investigating Authority, In the Matter of Red Raspberries From Canada;
USA-89-1904-01.
64 Reply Brief on Behalf of the Complainants, In the Matter of Red Raspberries From Canada;
USA-89-1904-01.
65 Supra note 8.
66 There were actually three issues raised, but the third was of little significance to this study.
Basically, it consisted of an assertion by Marco that its HM sales, consisting of a single sale of fresh
raspberries, should be compared to its sales of frozen bulk-packed raspberries in the United States in
order to determine FMV. This argument could only succeed if the fresh raspberries were considered
to be "similar merchandise" within the meaning of § 771(16) of the Tariff Act. This approach even-
tually failed, as the binational panel agreed with and put weight on an earlier statement of Marco
itself, which said that "the products were in no way comparable" (quote taken from Marco's ITA
questionnaire response of November 16, 1987).
67 Supra note 62, at 12.
68 For an explanation of why this is so, see Id. at 17, on constructed value. The complainants
contend that "the 8 percent statutory minimum for profit is wholly unrealistic in the context of the
red raspberry industry... like many agricultural commodities, the actual profit margin... is
substantially lower." Id. at 18.
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changed to allow the use of constructed value in such circumstances.
6 9
This constituted strong evidence that the ITA took an action which it
believed to be beyond the authority provided by Congress. Thus, the
complainants submitted that "the ITA cannot be permitted to do by ad-
ministrative fiat what the Congress refused to do by legislative
amendment."70
The complainants also argued that the ITA's own Antidumping
Duty Regulations did not provide that bona fide HM sales could be ig-
nored in favor of constructed value. That is, the ITA did not find that
the Canadian economy was state-controlled, or that HM sales were ficti-
tious or below the cost of production. All HM sales were also considered
viable when compared to third country sales. Therefore, complainants
claimed that "in this case.., the ITA attempts to ignore HM sales based
on a consideration not authorized by the regulations."7
Finally, the complainants pointed out that an agency seeking to im-
plement a certain policy must do so in accordance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), which calls for notice of the proposed rule in
the Federal Register as well as an opportunity for public comment.7 2
According to the complainants, the ITA attempted to enforce a rule re-
garding minimal HM sales in comparison to United States sales without
adhering to the APA notice and comment provisions. As a result, the
ITA becomes a less transparent, less predictable agency, creating uncer-
tainty as to what constitutes appropriate behavior and what will be pun-
ished as unacceptable dumping.
2. The View of the ITA
The ITA placed much weight on the fact that this was an unusual
case given the small number of HM sales and lack of an adequate third
country benchmark with which to compare them. The ITA argued that
a strict interpretation of the Tariff Act and the Antidumping Duty Regu-
lations, as advocated by the complainants, would create absurd results in
that the ITA could be required to compare a single HM sale to a million
69 This attempt took place through a letter to Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, from the late Malcom Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce,
and William E. Brock, United States Trade Representative. The letter outlined the ITA position on
the proposed Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984.
70 Supra note 62, at 31.
71 Id. at 39.
72 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) & (c) (1990). There is strong precedent for this in Carlisle & Rubber
Company v. U.S., 634 F. Supp. 419, 423 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), where the Court held that the policy
of ignoring dumping margins below 0.5 percent was subject to the notice and comment procedure of
the APA.
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United States sales. The ITA does not explain why the relatively minus-
cule HM sales are necessarily unrepresentative of FMV even when they
are bona fide and above the cost of production, as admitted by the ITA.
The ITA submitted that the legislature gave it the duty of making
reasonable price comparisons, and that to make the comparison com-
plainants sought would be a contravention of ITA's duty. Thus, the ITA
felt obligated to interpret the Tariff Act and the Antidumping Duty Reg-
ulations in a purposive instead of a literal manner.73 As interpreters of
the laws and regulations, the ITA chose to exercise its discretion by ig-
noring the exact wording of the statute in the name of protecting what
they perceived to be the statute's purpose.
The ITA also contested complainants' submission that the ITA had
violated the APA. The ITA submitted that the case did not involve the
making of a rule, but rather involved an adjudicatory process. The ITA
claimed that "an antidumping investigation is precisely the type of pro-
ceeding which may require the development of flexible standards on a
case by case basis," 74 and "the choice made between proceeding by gen-
eral rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
the informed discretion of the administrative agency' 7 . Thus, while the
ITA will publish regulations which govern how they will act, they will
not give up the flexibility which allows them to develop standards as new
situations arise.
3. The Panel Decision
On the first issue of whether the ITA decision was in accordance
with law, the panel thought it necessary to first ask whether Congress
had spoken to the issue. Had Congress done so, then the panel was will-
ing to follow the words of Congress, be they for or against the ITA. In
answering this question, the panel stated that "neither side has brought
any evidence that Congress ever considered the precise factual situation
presented in this review."' 76 Thus, the panel chose to take the position
73 In support of this, the brief of the Investigating Authority, supra note 63, at 22, states that "it
is an often quoted principle of statutory construction that the literal words of the statute are to be
read in the light of the purpose of the statute taken as a whole, and will not be followed when to do
so would lead to an absurd result." See U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197, 212-3 (1903). The ITA also cites the CIT case of Ceramic Regiomontana, S.A. v.
United States, 636 F. Supp. 961, 966 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), which states that the Tariff Act and
Antidumping Duty Regulations must be applied in a manner that will not "contravene or ignore the
intent of the legislature or the guiding purpose of the statute."
74 Supra note 63, at 39.
75 Id., quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Company, 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974), which in turn
quoted SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
76 Supra note 8, at 20.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:621(1991)
that absent legislation dealing specifically with the situation of HM sales
being compared to United States sales, the will of Congress cannot be
known and enforced. In addition, it rejected the assertion of the com-
plainants that the notice and comment provisions of the APA had been
violated, accepting the ITA position that adjudication and not rule mak-
ing was involved.
Having decided that Congress had not spoken to the issue at hand,
the panel followed the United States precedent of giving great deference
to the administrative interpretation of the statute.77
Unquestionably, such deference is called for where the statute is un-
clear or open to various interpretations. However, that did not appear to
be the case in this situation. The statute in question, § 773 of the Tariff
Act, clearly establishes HM sales as the preferred yardstick against
which to compare United States sales.78 Exceptions to the use of HM
sales are clearly enunciated.79 None of the exceptions include the situa-
tion in the case at hand. When asked by the ITA to include this type of
situation as an exception to the use of HM sales, Congress declined.80
Therefore, it appears that Congress clearly intended HM value to be used
in such a situation.
On this issue of whether the ITA determination was in accordance
with law, it would appear that the panel gave too much power to the
administrative agency. The panel allowed the ITA to interpret the rele-
vant legislation in a manner not in accordance with the common sense
reading. This may result in future uncertainty, as it will be difficult to
determine how the ITA will exercise such discretion in the future.
B. Is the ITA Determination Supported By Substantial Evidence?
L The Complainants' View
According to the complainants, the ITA stated its position that the
quantity of HM sales were insufficient to provide a meaningful basis for
77 FTA, Art. 1904(2) requires deference to United States judicial precedent, and the doctrine of
deferring to administrative agencies in the matter of interpreting the statutes they are charged with
enforcing was clearly outlined in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-4 (1984).
78 That "home market sales are clearly the preferred basis" was recognized in the case of Smith
Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1569 (1983), and is codified in the Antidumping
Duty Regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 353.3(a)(1) (1987).
79 As discussed earlier, supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text, these exceptions can be found
in the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 773(a)(1)(B), 773(a)(2); Antidumping Duty Regulations, 19 C.F.R.
§ 353 (1988).
80 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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price comparisons in "conclusory fashion".81 Their brief points out that
the ITA failed to support its conclusion regarding the sufficiency of HM
sales through either statistical, economic, or any other type of reasoning,
and also failed to offer an explanation for its action when one was re-
quested. 2 Contrary to the ITA's conclusion, the complainants asserted
that HM sales, having been made in bona fide transactions at arms length
at prevailing market prices, represented an extremely reliable measure of
FW.83
2. The View of the ITA
The ITA did not include in its brief any justification as to why the
HM sales of the complainants were an unreliable measure of FMV. The
ITA appeared to be satisfied with the explanation that the number and
quantity of sales were just too small. In fact, when pressed on this before
the binational panel, counsel for the ITA simply replied that the "ITA
know(s) inadequacy when we see it."
8 4
The ITA appeared to assume that sales of some minimal amount
cannot possibly provide a fair indication of FMY. Why this must be so is
not readily apparent. Where the sales are bona fide, as here, and not
simply an attempt to create a low standard against which U.S. sales will
be compared, it is incorrect to assume they are an unreliable indication of
FMV. Furthermore, the ITA approach leaves questions unanswered,
such as what percentage of sales are too few and whether the number or
the quantity of sales should be used as the basis for comparison.
3. The Panel Decision
The reasoning of the panel on this issue illustrates that while defer-
ence will be given to the administrative agency with respect to statutory
interpretation, agency discretion is not completely unfettered. Where the
statute is not clear and its interpretation is left to the ITA, the option
chosen must be supported by clearly articulated reasons. 85 Like the com-
plainants, the panel did not accept that the ITA's conclusions regarding
an insufficient number and volume of sales were self-evident. In particu-
lar, the panel could not blindly accept the de minimis classification of the
M&S HM sales, which were 7.8 percent of its United States sales by
81 Supra note 62, at 55.
82 Id at 56.
83 Id. at 57.
84 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Secretariat Transcript: In the Matter
of Red Raspberries From Canada, at 93 (October 20, 1989).
85 Supra note 8, at 20.
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number, and the Clearbrook HM sales, which were 12.5 percent of its
United States sales by number.16 As a result, the panel remanded the
decision to the ITA, with a request for reasons supporting the ITA's
decision to ignore these HM sales.
C. Final Resolution of the Raspberry Dispute
In light of the panel decision, the ITA attempted to provide support
for its decision sufficient to constitute substantial evidence. The ITA ex-
plained that the five percent standard of market viability used to compare
HM to third country sales was also used here. That is, the HM sales of
M&S and Clearbrook by volume were less than five percent of United
States sales.
The panel found this explanation completely unacceptable. First,
the panel objected to the ITA suddenly dropping the number of sales
from the analysis, and second, the panel stated that the ITA's choice of
the five percent standard when that choice is not mandated by statute
requires supporting reasoning before the substantial evidence test is
met. 87 As a result, on April 2, 1990 the panel ordered the ITA to amend
its final determination. 8
In accordance with the Panel Decision, the ITA altered its subsidy
calculation, using HM sales in determining the FMV of raspberries sold
by M&S and Clearbrook. This methodology led to dumping margins of
0.00 percent and 0. 11 percent for M&S and Clearbrook, respectively.
These de minimis levels allowed the two complainants to completely
avoid the imposition of antidumping duties.8 9
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL DECISION
As stated earlier, the binational panels as currently constituted do
not act as a panacea to the problems of trade law. But it is not an ideal
world in which we live. In order for the panels to be useful, they merely
must improve upon the system of dispute settlement which they replace.
The red raspberry case shows that the panels are quite likely to result in
significant improvements.
86 Id. at 21.
87 For an extended discussion, see In The Matter of Red Raspberries From Canada; Opinion of
the Panel Upon Remand, USA-89-1904-01.
88 In other words, an order was made under FTA, Art. 1904(8) to take action not inconsistent
with the Panel's decision.
89 The third complainant, Marco, was not so successful. Given that they had no HM or third
country sales of similar merchandise (they only had one HM sale, involving fresh, and not bulk
packed raspberries), the constructed value method used by the ITA was upheld as valid, and the
dumping margin of 9.15 percent calculated prior to the panel review stood.
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Some advantages of the panels cannot be disputed. For example,
major benefits include the reduction of the time and expense involved in
bringing an action, and the perception of the parties that the system re-
sults in a more fair and impartial hearing.9° The critics of Chapter
Nineteen of the FTA correctly note that the panels are bound by the laws
and precedents of the country in which the administrative determination
was made. This became evident in red raspberries, where the panel felt
compelled by precedent to show deference to the ITA's interpretation of
the Tariff Act, in spite of the fact that the ITA interpretation seemed to
be clearly in opposition to Congressional intent. However, in spite of the
correctness of this point, it should be noted that the critics were wrong in
extrapolating that panel decisions would be of no more benefit to Cana-
dian exporters than those by the CIT.
The reason for optimism is the panel requirement that substantial
evidence support the ITA determination. The result was that the export-
ers involved (excluding Marco) won the case resoundingly, having all
duties against them removed. Unlike the situation in the past, flexibility
was only granted to the ITA on a conditional basis, with the condition
being that their chosen methodology and resulting determination be
based on sound reasoning. In this case, the ITA failed to provide such
reasoning, and thus failed the 'substantial evidence' test. As a result, the
panel decision curtailed the ITA's flexibility and discretion.91
F. CONCLUSION
The results in this case can only be seen as a positive step forward
for Canadian exporters who were previously at the mercy of ITA and
90 In an interview conducted on July 31, 1990 with Ivan Feltham, Chairman of the panel in the
Red Raspberries case, it was confirmed that the general perceptions with respect to the effectiveness
and fairness of the panels were very positive. The importance of a favorable perception of panel
effectiveness should not be underestimated. As pointed out by Horlick, Oliver and Steger, supra note
23, at 71, "the panels.. .will also increase the perception of fairness and impartiality among business
people in the application of (trade) laws. An improved business climate and confidence in the fair
application of each country's trade laws should result in more willingness to export to the other
country and a corresponding removal of investment distortions between the two countries."
91 The importance of sound reasoning and the presence of substantial evidence was recently
underlined in the case of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork From Canada, supra note 9. In a report on
the case by Bertin, Panel Overturns U.S. Duty on Pork, Globe and Mail, August 25, 1990, at Bl, it is
stated that "The Binational Panel Review admonished the members of the U.S. International Trade
Commission.. .and told them, in effect, to try their math again." He also quotes from the decision
itself, which states "The panel remands the ITC's final determination... because it relied heavily on
statistics which appear at best questionable." This builds on the case of red raspberries, by refusing
to accept a determination where the evidence is inadequate to support the conclusion forwarded,
thus failing the substantial evidence test. Thus, the panels are showing a willingness to question the
economic data which the agency has relied upon in making their determination.
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ITC administrators. Three positive effects should flow from the red rasp-
berry decision. First, future panels will be able to learn from this case,
and apply the same high standard of substantial evidence. Second, the
ITA and ITC will think twice before making a determination unsup-
ported by strong supporting reasoning. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the FTA will deter United States producers from using the trade
laws as a strategic weapon, and will result in a decline in the number of
frivolous claims in search of protection from legitimate competitive pres-
sures. While the raspberries case is only the first to come before the
panel, its message is clear: proponents of protectionism beware.
